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The purpose of this research was to investigate the effects that user task load level has 
on the relationship between an individual's trust in and subsequent use of a system's 
automation. Automation research has demonstrated a positive correlation between an 
individual's trust in and subsequent use of the automation. Military decision-makers trust 
and use information system automation to make many tactical judgments and decisions. In 
situations of information uncertainty (information warfare environments), decision-makers 
must remain aware of information reliability issues and temperate their use of system 
automation if necessary. An individual's task load may have an effect on his use of a 
system's automation in environments of information uncertainty. 
It was hypothesized that user task load will have a moderating effect on the positive 
relationship between system automation trust and use of system automation. Specifically, in 
situations of information uncertainty (low trust), high task load will have a negative effect on 
the relationship. To test this hypothesis, an experiment in a simulated command and control 
micro-world was conducted in which system automation trust and individual task load were 
manipulated. The findings from the experiment support the positive relationship between 
automation trust and automation use found in previous research and suggest that task load 
does have a negative effect on the positive relationship between automation trust and 
automation use. 
vin 
TASK LOAD AND AUTOMATION USE IN AN UNCERTAIN 
ENVIRONMENT 
I.      INTRODUCTION 
Background 
In this information age, automation and information technologies (IT) are woven into 
every aspect of our lives   We are awakened to start the day by our automatic alarm clocks, 
and our fresh brewed coffee awaits us as it was pre-programmed to automatically percolate in 
anticipation of our awakening. We sit down to breakfast and read the freshly printed, 
personalized, automatically generated, downloaded, and printed paper from our desktop 
computer. We head to work on an automated subway system that gets us to our destination 
safely and on time. Throughout the day we are in constant communication with our fellow 
workers, family members and friends, via our e-mail, cell phones, call forwarding, fax 
machines, and personal digital assistants, all without giving it a second thought. 
Automation and information technologies are not just an aspect of our personnel 
lives. Over the last decade, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the use of and 
reliance upon information technologies and automation for the control and operation of many 
critical functions. These functions are part of what has become known as our critical 
information infrastructure. Theses functions include banking and finance, power control, air- 
traffic control, emergency services, e-commerce, and telecommunications, to name a few. 
The United States' reliance on such technologies prompted President Clinton, in 1996, to 
issue an Executive Order establishing a commission on critical infrastructure protection. Its 
charge was to study the nation's critical infrastructures and report on their vulnerabilities. 
The study found increasing dependence on critical infrastructures and increasing 
vulnerabilities but insufficient awareness of those vulnerabilities (Denning, 1999). 
As our world becomes more technologically advanced, society becomes more 
accustomed to technology and automation as it becomes routine and integral in or lives. We 
tend to trust the technology, or as Barber (1983) puts it, we gain expectation of technical 
competence in the technology. The increasing reliance and use in automation and technology 
has lead researchers to examine the many aspects of human-computer interaction 
(Parasuraman, 1987; Murray and Caldwell, 1999; Dillion and Morris, 1996; Wickens, 1999). 
Trust in automation is one area that continues to generate interest among researchers 
(Sheridan, 1988; Lee and Moray, 1992; Muir 1994; Muir and Moray, 1996; Jian, Bisantz, 
Drury and Llins, 1998; Tseng and Fogg, 1999; Fields, 2001). 
Research has suggested that trust can affect how people accept and rely on automated 
systems (Sheridan, 1988). For example, researchers have studied issues of human trust in 
simulated automated environments in which they found that an operator's decision to use 
automatic or manual control of a processes depended on the trust he had in the system's 
automation and his confidence in his own abilities to control the system (Muir and Morray, 
1996; Lee and Moray, 1994). Others have suggested that people become vulnerable to 
negative consequences because of their trust in information systems (Bonoma, 1976; Giffin, 
1967). These vulnerabilities will only increase as society continues its increasing use of and 
reliance on information systems and automation. 
Research Applicability to the United States Air Force 
As with the civilian infrastructure, the Department of Defense (DoD) as well as the 
individual services are becoming increasingly dependent on automation and information 
technologies. An example of this reliance on technology was highlighted by Mr. Art Money 
in 1999, the civilian in charge of the Pentagon's information security, when he stated, " The 
United States now relies on information systems to such an extent that an attack against those 
systems would present a genuine threat to U.S. security" (Myers, 1999:1). The change from 
the more traditional military to a more technologically advanced military has caused what is 
termed the Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA (Metz, 2000). The RMA is the 
transforming of the U.S. military into a leaner, faster, higher-tech fighting machine, of which 
automation is a key component. The U.S. Military is noted for considering advanced 
technology to be a force multiplier, a force extender, and a force enabler. Automation affects 
everything on the battlefield including combat vehicles, communication, weapons systems, 
intelligence gathering/processing, and command and control (Tyler, 1997). As such, these 
systems, which the military is becoming more dependent on, become a valuable target set 
and must be protected. 
Increased reliance on and use of information systems is particularly true in the United 
States Air Force. Over the last 4 years, the Air Force placed great emphasis in modernizing 
and automating its command and control systems (Bearden, 2000). In fact, an entire 
organization has been established, the Aerospace Command and Control, Surveillance, 
Intelligence and Reconnaissance Center (AC2ISRC), with responsibilities for modernization 
planning, operational requirements, configuration control and Air Force requirements 
generation. Such modernized systems include the Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS) and the Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS). These systems are 
designed to provide crucial information at the appropriate time and displayed in such a way 
to enable commanders at every level of war to better prosecute a conflict (Breaden, 2000). 
The fact that commanders at all levels trust and rely on automated information 
systems for decision-making makes these systems prime targets for our adversaries. 
Tampering or disruption of such systems by an adversary can have serious implications on 
the battlefield. This disruption and or tampering, is termed offensive counter- information 
warfare (AFDD 2-5, 1998:9). By conducting Information Warfare (IW), an adversary can 
attempt to compromise tactical decision-making by making it difficult for decision-makers to 
assess situations and take appropriate actions. In addition, false or distorted information may 
fool a decision-maker into actions detrimental to his own forces. 
The Air Force has experienced a steady increase in attacks against its information 
systems and experts agree that this trend will increase. These attacks are coming from a 
variety of attackers, from foreign intelligence services, to organized crime to malicious 
insiders (Fleeger, 2001). Much work has been done to mitigate the risk of such attacks to 
include the development of effective physical barriers such as firewalls and virtual private 
networks in addition to increased security awareness training for personnel (Mayer 2000). 
Despite the efforts, attacks continue. 
Research by Bisantz et al., (2000) has indicated that IW may impact an individual's 
trust in and use of an automated information system by reducing the perceived reliability of 
information presented. As an individual's trust in a system decreases so does his use of the 
system's automation in favor of alternative means of task completion. Related research by 
Skita, Moiser & Burdick, (1996) involving unreliable information and the use of automated 
aids, found, as the task demands of verifying unreliable information increased, the 
subsequent use of automation increased. This was the case despite the leve 1 of information 
reliability. Because of the serious consequences that may arise from relying on system 
automation in situations where information presented may be unreliable, i.e. in military IW 
environments, it is important to understand how decision-makers under varying levels of task 
load may rely upon critical systems automation. 
Problem Statement and Purpose of Research 
The main purpose of this study was to begin to answer the following two questions: 
First, is there a relationship between an individual's perceived trust in a system's automation 
and his subsequent use of the automation? Second, does an individual's task load play a 
moderating role in the relationship between trust and automation use? Both questions were 
framed in an environment in which trust level was degraded; i.e., in an IW environment. 
Factors that influence an individual's trust and subsequent use of automation in an 
adversarial environment are important due to the unwanted and potentially dangerous 
consequences that may occur when tampered information is utilized in critical decisions. 
This is true not only for the United States Air Force, but for any organization that relies upon 
information systems for critical decision-making. 
Summary 
The information age has brought about exciting advances in technology, especially in 
the area of automation, that have produced great benefits in terms of increased efficiency and 
productivity in areas such as finance, power control and information processing. These 
benefits have resulted in increased use of and reliance on such technologies for critical 
decision-making, thus producing increased liabilities in terms of vulnerabilities to 
interruption and deception. Because the vulnerabilities exist and are being exploited, it is 
important to understand the affects that exploiting these vulnerabilities have on the trust an 
individual places in these technologies and his resulting use of the technology for critical 
decision-making. This is especially true in the United States Air Force as it continues to 
increase its use of and reliance on such technologies for command and control decision- 
making in adversarial environments. 
Thesis Organization 
The following chapters present support for the model that was used to observe factors 
that may influence an individual's trust in an information systems automation and subsequent 
use during varying task load in an adversarial environment. Chapter II provides a literature 
review of the body of work in decision-making, command and control, information warfare, 
and trust in automation. Hypotheses are presented that were tested in an empirical 
experiment. Chapter III presents the experimental and methodological framework for the 
experiment used to test the hypotheses. Chapter IV presents the statistical analysis of the 
data collected from the experiment. Finally, Chapter V presents the research findings and 
conclusions. 
II.      LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the literature reviewed for this study with the aim of providing 
the reader pertinent background information related to the human-information system trust 
relationship within the context of an adversarial command and control environment. The 
chapter begins by presenting information on the following theories and concepts: decision- 
making, command and control, information warfare, trust; including human-human trust, and 
human-computer trust, trust in automation and trust in an adversarial environment. Next, a 
trust model is presented based on the related literature. Finally, hypotheses are presented 
based on the trust model that relates constructs that may influence an individual's trust and 
subsequent use of systems automation. 
Theories and Models of Decision-making 
To understand the various factors that affect human's trust in information systems in 
a command and control environment, it is important to first understand how information 
systems are utilized in this venue. Today's military command and control systems give 
commanders the means to exercise authority and direct forces in accomplishment of the 
mission. Commanders "use information to support decision-making and coordinate actions 
that will influence friendly and enemy forces to the commanders advantage" (Joint Pub 6-0, 
1995: 1-2). In order to understand how decisions are made and what influences a decision- 
maker, a brief review of relevant decision-making processes and research was performed. 
Decision - Making Processes 
Decision-making methods can be broken down into two distinct terms: analytical and 
intuitive (Klein, 1988; Klein and Klinger 1991). Analytical methods are based on logical 
analysis of the decision situation while intuitive based decisions rely upon pattern recognition 
and experience. A good example illustrating both methods was the series of chess matches 
between chess master Gary Kasparov and the computer Deep Blue. "The computer used 
detailed and exhaustive option analysis to decide on each move while the chess master 
decided his moves based largely on knowledge, experience and recognition of patterns" 
(Bergstrand, 1997:1). 
Rational Choice Model 
Early research in decision-making, 1955 through 1975 was centered around analytical 
decision-making (Collyer and Malecki, 1998). One model, the Rational Choice Model is the 
baseline against which other models are compared (Allison, 1971). The rational choice 
model is based upon an economic view of decision-making. It is grounded on 
goals/objectives, alternatives, consequences, and optimality. The model assumes that 
complete information regarding the decision to be made is available and one correct 
conception of a problem, or decision to be made can be determined. In a strict sense, the 
rational model states that people choose among different alternatives by moving through a 
series of steps based upon the ir knowledge of the situation and the desirability of the 
outcomes (Simon, 1957). Collyer and Malecki (1998) and Klein (1988) point out that a 
major limitation with the rational model is the long time required to structure the decision 
problem and obtain judgments needed to derive a solution. March and Simon, (1958) also 
point out limitations in that the model makes the assumption that a decision can be made with 
certainty, when in reality most decisions are made with uncertainty. The best times to use 
analytical decision-making are in situations with low time pressures, the need for careful 
documentation exists and in a context free task with many components (Klein, 1988). 
Naturalistic Decision-making 
For many years classical analytical decision-making theories, such as the rational 
approach, were accepted by most decision researches (Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Pruit, 
1998). Since the mid 1980's, some researchers have turned their attention to the more 
intuitive approach toward decision-making, or naturalistic decision-making because, "it is not 
feasible to apply classical decision- making research analyses to many real life situations 
because it fails to account for decision-maker experience, task complexity, and the demands 
of the naturalistic environment" (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993:19). Researchers have moved 
away from the static environment of the laboratory and embarrassed a more naturalistic view 
involving the more complex real world and the systems in it. Researches have replaced 
college students in laboratories with experts and operators in their natural environments 
(Randal and Pugh, 1996; Collyer and Malecki, 1998). Naturalistic decision-making is 
derived from the study of how individuals make decisions in real situations in their natural 
environment. Klein (1993) provides a description of naturalistic decision-making and gives a 
description of the process as it occurs in the field. Naturalistic decision-making is 
characterized by dynamic and continually changing conditions and involves eight required 
setting characteristics (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993). These eight characteristics are shown 
in table 1 on the following page. 
Table 1: Characteristics of Naturalistic Decision-Making Settings 
Characteristics of Naturalistic Decision-Making Settings 
111-structured problems 
Uncertain dynamic environments 





Organizational goals and norms 
Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Pruitt (1996) describe additional factors, among others, 
that help define naturalistic decision-making are multiple event feedback loops and time 
constraints. They propose that decisions in real environments are temporally dependent and 
ongoing with the outcome of iterative decisions affecting subsequent decisions and that time 
to decision is often critical to the success of the decision outcome. The concept of time, or 
speed in decision-making and iterative decisions support a similar concept that is part of Col 
John Boyd's Asymmetric Fast Transient theory of conflict, a subset of which is called the 
OODA loop. The OODA Loop was offered to explain how military commanders make 
decisions in a command and control environment (Fadock, Boyd and Warden, 1995). 
Observation, Orientation Decision Action (OODA) Loop Theory 
Boyd's OODA loop can be seen as a variation on the rational choice model of 
decision-making. The OODA loop model's premise is that decision-making is the result of 
rational behavior (Boyd, 1987). As such the process can be depicted as a cycle of four stages 
that describes the decision-making process of military commanders in C2 environments. 






Figure 1: The OODA Loop 
The first stage of the OODA loop is observation. It is here where the decision-maker must 
observe what is happening around him and determine the circumstances under which he must 
function. He collects and synthesizes available data from a variety of means and sources to 
obtain situational awareness, which occurs in the second stage, the orientation stage of the 
loop. 
Orientation is the next stage in the OODA loop. After the data is collected, it must be 
synthesized into information by the decision-maker. This is where the decision-maker 
orients himself to the information he observed by creating a mental picture of the world 
around him (Fadock, 1995). Klein's (1998) Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model 
supports this concept. It is in this stage that a decision-maker uses the information and his 
own knowledge to recognize a situation as typical. The RPD model emphasizes the 
importance of situation assessment in expert decision-making (Drillings and Serfaty, 1997). 
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The mental image, which is formed during orientation, and is influenced by the decision- 
makers experience or recognition serves as the foundation upon which a decision will occur. 
Coming to a decision is the third stage in the OODA loop. Here the decision-maker 
weighs the information gathered, considers the alternative courses of action and makes a 
decision. This is consistent with the Rational Model. In stressful, complex, dynamic 
situations the element of time criticality is one of the most distinctive features of decision- 
making (O'Hare, 1992). The RPD model may provide an explanation as to why military 
commanders are able to make decisions faster than what would be considered normal using 
the rational choice model. RPD focuses on assessing the situation rather than considering 
multiple courses of action. More effort is said to be expended on understanding and 
assessing the situation, which results in a reasonably good course of action to take. In this 
way the decision-maker does not generate a list of options, they make a decision and act 
upon it as soon as the minimum information is acquired (Randel and Pugh, 1996). 
The last stage in the OODA loop is the action stage. It is here where the decision- 
maker initiates some action or behavior based on the three previous stages. The action may 
include the decision not to act. Observation of the actions or inactions starts the cycle over 
again. The amount of time used by a decision-maker to cycle through the OODA loop is 
often referred to as the cycle speed or size of the loop. Boyd contends that one can paralyze 
an enemy by operating inside his OODA loop, in other words operating at a faster cycle time 
(Fadok, 1995). 
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This is demonstrated in the following statement: 
An engagement between two opposing sides can be seen as competition 
to possess the smallest OODA loop. The side with the smallest OODA 
loop operates at a much higher tempo, forcing the opposing side to react 
to its moves. Through a successful campaign of subversion, deception, 
and psychological operations, friendly forces can increase the size of an 
opponent's OODA loop, while reducing the size of their own 
(Crawford, 1995:5). 
In Boyd's Asymmetric Fast Transient theory of conflict, the goal is to operate at a faster 
speed than your opponent can react. In other words, make better decisions at a faster pace 
than your adversary. Information warfare is one means by which an adversary can interrupt 
or impede the OODA loop process within a command and control environment. It is 
therefore important to understand the components involved within this command and control 
environment and how they may be disrupted in order to influence the OODA loop process 
and thus affect decision-making. 
Decision Support Systems 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) are one component within the command and control 
environment that may be taken advantage of by an adversary through the use of IW activities. 
DSS systems are used and designed for many types of organizations including hospitals, 
banks, insurance companies, and military organizations. A DDS system is an interactive 
computer based system that aids decision-makers in using stored data to solve ill-structured, 
unstructured, or semi-structured problems (Sprague and Carlson, 1982). Holsapple and 
Whinston (1996) describe five characteristics that should be observed in a DSS system. 
These five characteristics are: (1) DSS contains knowledge describing aspects of the 
decision-makers environment, that indicates how to accomplish a range of tasks, and that 
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indicates valid conclusions in different circumstances; (2) DSS has an ability to acquire and 
maintain descriptive knowledge as well as other kinds of knowledge as well; (3) DSS has an 
ability to present knowledge on an ad hoc basis in various customized ways as well as in 
standardized reports; (4) DSS has an ability to select any desired subset of stored knowledge 
for either presentation or deriving new knowledge in the course of problem recognition 
and/or problem solving; (5) DSS can interact directly with a decision-maker or a participant 
in a decision in such a way that the user has a flexible choice and sequence of knowledge- 
management activities. In general, a DSS must provide up-to-date, timely information that is 
complete and accurate and in an appropriate format which is easily understood and can be 
manipulated. 
With the advent of the revolution in military affairs, and the reorganization of the Air 
Force into an Expeditionary Force, the United States Air Force has seen increasing use of 
information technology, including DSS, within its command and control environment to aid 
people in critical decisions. This is evident in extensive development and recent deployment 
of the Integrated Command and Control System (IC2S) block 00, which is a global network 
of software systems that links data bases, operations centers, sensors, and shooters, the core 
of which is the Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) (AC2ISRC, 1999:3). 
Therefore, a review of command and control (C2) literature was performed in order to 
understand the role of C2 and establish a relationship between information systems and 
human trust in these systems. 
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Command and Control 
Although there are many differing definitions of what C2 means, (James, 1999) the 
Air Force defines command and control as, "The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 
the mission" (AF Directory 33-303, 1999:14). Roman (1996) suggests the military adopt a 
C2 organizational structure that promotes decentralized decision-making by eliminating 
layers of command by flattening the organization hierarchy. He states that centralized 
control by a hierarchical organization may no longer be possible in future fast tempo 
conflicts. He believes information gathering and decision-making must be made at the level 
in which the information is received, before that information is passed on to higher levels. 
Roman believes, by allowing contact troops to make decisions based on first hand 
information, a chaotic environment can be made less chaotic at higher levels due to a 
decrease in the amount of information that needs to flow up the command hierarchy. The 
modernization of the Air Force's C2 environment is allowing for more decentralized control 
by leveraging modern technology that enables commanders at every level to better prosecute 
a conflict (Bearden, 2000). With this switch from a more centralized control to more 
decentralized control, commanders at all levels are becoming reliant on information systems 
as a means to collect, analyze, and display real-time information from multiple sources and 
sensors in order to make critical decisions about an evolving tactical situation. Dillion & 
Morris (1996) suggest that trust in both the information system and the source of the 
information helps determine the usefulness and value of such tools for the decision-maker. 
Bisantz et al., (2000) proposed a framework for studying human trust in automated 
decision-making aids in a C2 environment. Their study suggested that the threat of an attack 
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by an adversary against a C2 system was a significant factor that influenced decision-making 
in a C2 environment. It is therefore beneficial to take a look at the literature on this unique- 
military threat known as Information Warfare. 
Information Warfare 
Information Warfare (IW) is an often-used buzzword in today's military circles. The 
concept is based on the fact that information and information technologies are becoming 
increasingly important to our national security. Information warfare research is a top priority 
of the Department of Defense (Myers, 1999). Although a hot topic today, information, and 
its use has always been a critical factor in times of war. According to Clausewitz, "imperfect 
knowledge of the situation.. .can bring military action to a standstill" (Howard and Paret, 
1976:56). Sun Tzu in 500 B.C., talked a great deal about the value of information, he 
believed it was inherent in war fighting. Deception, a form of misinformation, was one of 
Sun Tzu'z tenets of warfare (Sun Tzu, 1983). It may be obvious that the more a force knows 
about itself and its enemy, the stronger that force will be in times of battle. What is less 
obvious are the varying uses of the available information and how it can be manipulated to 
reinforce or weaken the strength of a fighting force. In times past, information gathering, 
deception and battles required enemies to be in close proximity of one another. With the 
modern complexities of war and the ensuing information technological advances, these 
activities can now be employed from a great distance, with varying techniques and with 
anonymity. An enemy, as well as our own forces, can now attack critical information 
systems for varying results, using a wide variety of techniques. Hence, it is important to 
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understand which of these techniques may affect a military decision-maker's trust in the C2 
information systems they rely upon. 
What is information warfare? Libicki (1995), describes coming to grips with a 
definition is like the proverbial effort of the blind men to discover the nature of the elephant: 
the one who touched its leg described it as a tree, the one who touched its tail called it a rope, 
etc. The literature groups IW into two broad categories; one that sees the use of IW to 
support decision-making and combat operations while the other regards information as a 
weapon in warfare (Whitehead, 1997). The Air Force defines information warfare as "any 
action to deny, exploit corrupt or destroy the enemy's information and its functions while 
protecting Air Force assets against those actions and exploiting its own military information 
operations" (Joint Publication 3-13.1, 1998:3). The Chinese definition of information 
warfare is similar to the Air Forces. The Chinese define IW as the "use of firepower and 
command to obtain and to deny information, to suppress and counter suppress, and to deceive 
and counter deceive, as well as to destroy and counter the destruction of sources of 
information" (Mengxiong, 1995:16). Joint Publication 3-13.1 (1998) describes an 
application of IW that employs various techniques and technologies to attack or protect a 
specific target set, command and control, called Command and Control Warfare (C2W). 
C2W integrates the use of military deception, psychological operations, operations security, 
and physical destruction, all supported by intelligence, with the aim of denying information 
to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 
capabilities against such actions. 
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Information Manipulation Theory 
As in Sun Tzu's time, deception with an aim of influencing decisions, is still a key 
component in IW operations. The Air Force uses C2 technologies (information systems) 
increasingly in a variety of ways, from managing and moving supplies and troops to 
monitoring and tracking enemy movements to weapons targeting and acquisition. The 
intentional manipulation or spoofing of these information systems poses a great threat to 
military command and control decision-makers (Kuel, 2000). Imagine if one could alter the 
information on quantities of critical supplies being shipped to a certain location, the 
coordinates of critical intelligence buildings, or an Air Tasking Order that sent a flight of 
aircraft to a target that was not there or was something different than what was expected. 
Recall the fallout from the mistaken NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 
1999. The U.S. and Britain contend that the bombing was the result of intelligence sources 
having used an old and unreliable map (Marsden, 2001). Imagine a scenario where a rouge 
nation manipulates information in a U.S. command and control center that causes an 
unplanned incident or series of incidents such as the Chinese embassy bombing. Such action 
could facilitate the undesired (from the U.S. perspective) conflict between nations. The 
potential damage caused by an adversary by creating false information in our command and 
control systems is enormous. 
McCornack, Levine, Morrison, and Lapinski (1996) introduced the theory of 
information manipulation to describe deception in communication. This theory suggests that 
violation of one or more of the maxims (quantity, quality, relation, and manner) results in a 
deceptive communication. For example, the intentional manipulation of the number and type 
of aircraft at a particular airbase in a C2 information system violates the maxim of quality 
and, therefore would be classified as information manipulation. This theory also suggests 
that the intentional manipulation of information may influence a decision-maker to make a 
decision that is different from what he would have made given the original information. 
Because information warfare is a threat and command and control environments, such 
as Air Operations Centers, are increasingly reliant upon automated information systems to 
aid decision-makers in critical decisions, there is potential for adversarial forces to tamper 
with and disrupt such tools. Llinas et al., (1998) indicate information warfare can impact an 
adversary's operation through information disruption, denial, and distortion. These means 
can make it difficult for a decision-maker to assess situations and take appropriate action as 
well as cause or fool them into taking actions undesirable actions. Give n the potential for IW 
to corrupt and disrupt information provided by automated information systems it is important 
to understand to what extent decision-makers rely on and use these systems and what factors 
may influence an individual's trust in such systems. 
Trust Definitions and Concepts 
Nass, Fogg and Moon (1996) and others, have found that the trust relationship 
between humans and computers is similar to the trust relationship that humans have between 
each other. Many of social rules and dynamics, which guide behavior in human interactions, 
also apply to human-computer interactions. Given this finding, it may be assumed that 
antecedents of trust in human-computer interaction are likely to be the same as antecedents of 
trust between humans. Definitions of trust, as it applies in human-computer interactions, are 
drawn from definitions of trust developed to apply to human relationships (Muir, 1998). The 
word trust is so frequently used in our everyday language that most sources assume the 
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audience knows what it means and thus is rarely defined. When it is defined within scholarly 
literature however, definitions form a wide range of meanings (McKnight and Chervany, 
1996). Before talking specifically about research regarding trust in automation, a brief 
review of the meaning and concepts of trust is presented. 
Common definitions of trust mainly concentrate on interpersonal aspects rather than 
on trust in social or technical systems and also tend to focus on personal sources, effects of 
trust or behavioral aspects. Evidence of this can be seen in Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary (1993) as it defines trust as follows: (1) Assured reliance on a person 
or thing, (2) Dependence on something future or contingent, (3) An equitable right or 
interest, (4) A charge or a duty imposed in faith or confidence or as a condition of some 
relationship, something committed or entrusted to one to be used or cared for in the interest 
of another. There are additional definitions that can be used to examine trust in automation 
from a human factors perspective which are more specific to trust in human relationships 
than Webster's definitions. Barber (1983) a sociologist, recognizes trust as having multi- 
dimensional characteristics and defines trust in terms of three specific expectations: 
persistence of natural and moral laws, technically competent performance, and fiduciary 
obligations and responsibility. 
Trust is also a dynamic construct that changes over time as experience in the 
relationship grows. Zanna (1985) suggested that trust between individuals has dynamic 
characteristics and regards trust as a generalized expectation that undergoes predictable 
changes as a result of experience in a relationship. The three characteristics are: 
predictability, dependability, and faith and can be seen as representing stages in a 
relationship (Remple et al, 1985). Predictability, which forms the basis of trust early in a 
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relationship, is built on predictability of behaviors and therefore, built on observable factors. 
As the relationship matures, trust comes to rest on dependability. It is based on the 
attribution of the qualities and characteristics of the trusted individual. Finally, growth of 
trust depends on a leap of faith because one cannot determine dependability of behaviors in 
future situations, which have yet been exhibited (Llinas et al., 1998; Remple et al., 1985). 
While the discussion above represents classifications of trust related to human - 
human relationships, Sheridan (1988) offered additional attributes of trust in the realm of 
human- computer relationships. Sheridan examined how trust affects an operator's use, or 
non-use of an automated aid when the opportunity arises. Sheridan suggested seven 
attributes of trust in command and control systems: Reliability, which implies the reliable, 
predictable, and consistent functioning of a system; Robustness, is the demonstrated or 
promised ability of a system to perform in a variety of conditions and circumstances; 
Familiarity, is the feeling of being comfortable with your ability to deal with a situation or 
object despite there being a high degree of novelty associated with it; Understandability, has 
to do with ones ability to develop an appropriate mental model of the situation, possibly with 
the aid of familiarity; Explication of Intention, rather than leaving a person in a position of 
having to understand and discover covert meanings from a system's behavior, this attribute 
allows people to trust others over those who just perform tasks; Usefulness, this attribute 
defines the level at which data or machines respond in a useful way that creates something of 
value for system users; Dependency, is the level to which an operator is willing to depend on 
a machine. It is from these definitions, characteristics and attributes that trust models have 
been developed and subsequent research in the area of human trust in automated information 
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systems and decision aids has been conducted, (e.g. Zuboff, 1988; Lee and Moray, 1992; 
Muir and Moray, 1996; Sheridan, 1988; Skitka, Mosier, and Burdick, 2000). 
Trust in Automation Research 
Zuboff (1988) studied how people trust automated systems in the workplace. The 
research found that people tended to distrust the technology of the automated system and thus 
used the system less or that they tended to over trust the system, which resulted in other 
problems when the system failed. Other empirical studies, consistent with Zuboff s, have 
shown that people's strategies with regards to the use or non-use of automated aids may be 
affected by their trust in the system. Muir (1987) developed a hypothetical model of human 
-machine trust, which consisted of the linear combination of characteristics that Barber 
(1983) outlined. Muir's model depicted human trust by the combination of persistence of 
predictable behavior, technically competent performance, fiduciary responsibility, and the 
interaction between these characteristics. 
By conducting a series of experiments on a continuous chemical process control 
simulation, Lee and Morray (1992) and Muir and Morray (1996) extended earlier work by 
Muir and developed a dynamic model of trust. They produced a model depicting that an 
individual's current level of trust was affected by his previous level of trust as well as system 
factors such as the existence of automation faults and system performance. In other words, 
this model incorporated the additional characteristics of predictability, dependability, and 
faith as explored by Zanna (1985) but related them to the human - computer trust 
relationship developed by Muir. These studies found that workers monitoring the automated 
systems became complacent when the system was perceived to perform correctly, and that 
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workers who perceived the system was prone to errors spent more time monitoring the 
system. In addition, the studies showed that an operator's decision to use the automation or 
manual control's depended on his perceived reliability of the automated system (trust in the 
system), as well as his perceived reliability of manual control (trust in self) to manage the 
system. There was a very high correlation between an individual's trust and the use of 
automation. These studies also produced evidence that suggests that once an individual 
perceives an error in the automation, his trust in the system will degrade for a period of time 
and then gradually rebound over time. 
Automation Bias 
More recent studies in the use of automation that are consistent with Zuboff s (1988) 
study and those of Muir and others describe phenomena called the automation bias, (e.g., 
Mosier, Skitka, Heers & Burdick, 1997, 1998; Skitka, Mosier & Burdick, 1999). 
Automation bias is the " tendency to use automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant 
information seeking and processing" (Skitka, Mosier & Burdick, 1999). In other words, the 
tendency for a decision-maker to over-rely on automation to perform tasks and make 
decisions rather than using the automated aid as one component of the decision-making 
process. Theses studies identified two classes of errors that routinely emerge in highly 
automated decision environments, these being omission errors and commission errors. 
Omission errors are defined as, "failures to respond to system irregularities or events when 
automated devices fail to detect or indicate them," and commission errors as "errors which 
occur when people incorrectly follow an automated directive or recommendation, without 
verifying it against other available information" (Skitka and Moiser, 1999: 344). A Conejo 
and Wickens (1997) study involving an Army threat target recognition tool, provides a good 
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example of a commission error. They found that on occasion when an automated cue was 
unreliable, directing attention to something that was not the designated target, pilots were 
still very likely to choose the non-target as the target, despite the fact that the true target was 
known to the pilot and visible on the system display. These studies provide evidence that 
automation bias exits and may be due to excessive reliance on trusted automated systems. 
Truth Bias 
Automation bias is similar to another phenomena described by McCornack et al., 
(1996) called truth bias. Truth bias suggests that as a trusted relationship develops between 
individuals, they are apt to believe information given to them by others in the relationship 
without verifying the information. Biros (1998) extended McCornack's truth bias theory to 
include an individual's trust in artifacts generated by an information system as he examined 
the effects of information manipulation through his proposed artifact truth bias model. 
Automation bias, truth bias and artifact truth bias provide additional support to the findings 
of Nass, Fogg and Moon (1996) that suggest that individuals trust information systems in the 
same way as individuals trust others. In addition, automation bias and artifact truth bias 
provide support to the notion that decision-makers who rely on and trust information systems 
may be vulnerable to certain aspects of information warfare. 
Automated Aids in an Adversarial Environment 
The studies mentioned above provide a good foundation for continued research in the 
area of human-computer trust but are limited in the fact that they have dealt with situations 
where human trust was measured in terms of the behavior of the automated system with 
regards to its predictability, dependability and the user's faith in the system in a benign 
process control environment. A military command and control environment adds additional 
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facets to the trust relationship in that the automated system is open to deliberate manipulation 
by an enemy. Human operators must not only deal with mechanistic failures, but also 
predetermined deception or misguidance perpetrated by an adversary. Research in this 
military unique situation was, until recently, non-existent. 
The majority of research conducted has been by a team of researches at the Center for 
Multi-source Information Fusion Department of Industrial Engineering at State University of 
New York at Buffalo, (e.g. Llinas et al.,1998; Biasntz et al., 2000) Three phases of research 
have been conducted to date. The first phase consisted of a comprehensive literature review 
and discussion, which focused on "defining, characterizing, and modeling the dependences 
and vulnerabilities of aided-adversarial decision-making (AADM) on components of 
information" (Bisantz et al., 2000:1). (Aided-adversarial decision-making refers to decision- 
making by military personnel with computerized aids in an environment where there is the 
potential for information warfare activities by an adversary to corrupt the decision aids) 
During phase one, in order to investigate the human-computer trust relationship in this more 
specific situation of AADM, Llinas et al, (1998) proposed a Lens Model approach, as shown 
in Figure 2, for the modeling of human trust in automated systems. 
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Model of Human Trust in Automation 




Useful or not? 
Level of Trust 
Use or not use? 
Human Operator 
Figure 2: Adapted Lens Model of Human Trust in Automation 
They felt the lens model provided a means "for modeling both human judgment 
policy and the actual structure of the environment, it allows operator calibration to the actual 
trustworthiness of a system to be explicitly considered" (Llinas et al., 1998:99). Observable 
cues (characteristics), which an operator would use to make a judgment, may include the 
characteristics and components of trust as described by Sheridan (1988) and others. For 
example, predictability, dependability, faith, and reliability may be cues used. During phase 
two an experimental framework was established to evaluate the lens model approach in an 
information warfare environment. In this environment trust was considered in the context of 
adversarial decision-making in which information may be intentionally altered or degraded 
by an adversary (Seong, Llinas, Durry, and Bisantz, 1999). In addition to the development of 
a framework for experimentation, an empirically based, multi-dimensional scale of trust, 
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which could be used for the purposes of measuring an individual's feeling of trust in an 
automated system was developed. In developing the trust scale, the authors found empirical 
evidence that the concepts of trust and distrust were opposites and that one scale can be used 
to measure both. In addition, the study found that concepts of general trust, human-human 
trust, and human-machine trust were similar (Jian et al., 1998). 
The third phase of the research involved initial empirical investigation into the trust- 
related vulnerabilities of AADM. The investigations were built upon the experimental 
framework and Irust measurement scale developed in the prior phase as well as the 
development of an experimental test-bed in which experiments could be run on (Bisantz et 
al., 2000). The initial experiment was conducted to assess how an individual's decision 
performance and selection of information (implying trust in the system) were affected by 
different system failure causes, (i.e. sabotage, hardware/software failure, or unspecified). 
Results of the experiment indicated that different fault causes (i.e. information warfare) may 
impact an individual's trust in and use of an automated information system. In addition, 
results showed that the trust scale developed in phase two of the research could be used to 
identify differences in the level of trust as system and environmental conditions varied. The 
framework and trust scale developed as well as the data gathered in theses three phases of 
research, provide a good source of information and data for future research to use and 
compare to. 
Another recently completed study in this area, Fields (2001), focused on the effect 
external safeguards have on an individual's trust in a system in an information warfare 
environment. In this study, participants were immersed into a complex command and control 
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scenario using a high-fidelity computer simulation in order to measure the effects of the 
















Figure 3:  Fields Adapted Model of Trust 
Using the above adapted model of trust drawn form McKnight and Chervaney (1996) 
Fields hypothesized, among other things, that external safeguards would have a positive 
effect on trusting behavior and that the presence of information manipulation will have a 
negative effect on trusting behavior. Although not conclusive, and one that bears further 
investigation, Fields' study showed a negative effect on trusting behavior when external 
safeguards were high. In addition, results indicated that a perceived information warfare 
attack had no effect on an individual's trusting behavior. A factor that may have influenced 
whether an individual tried to verify possible suspect information when they perceived an 
information warfare attack is task load. Subjects indicated that they were so busy 
concentrating on performing the required task that they either did not have time to contact a 
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verification source or they had forgotten about the option to contact a verification source. 
Task load may have played a role in the participant's loss of complete situational awareness. 
Task Load and Situational Awareness 
Situational Awareness (SA) is the decision-maker's moment-by-moment ability to 
monitor and understand the state of a complex system and its environment (occurs in the 
orientation stage of Boyd's OODA loop). The completeness and accuracy of decision- 
makers situational awareness' is crucial to the ability to make decisions during emergences 
(Wickens, 1998). To maintain an accurate SA the decision-maker should take into account 
both information that is available and that which can be activated from memory (Lyons, 
2000). In a high task environment, when a decision-maker is confronted with several threats, 
memory load can quickly become overloaded (Lyons, 2000). This memory overload can 
cause an individual to begin to dismiss important cues, existing and past, from the 
environment (Weick, 1995). This situation of increased workload and its effects can cause a 
decrease in situation awareness as depicted in Wickens, Mavor, Parasuraman, and McGees's 
(1998) model of failure recovery in air traffic control shown in figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4:  Model of Failure Recovery in Air Traffic Control 
The presence of information warfare activities may be one such critical cue 
dismissed by an individual in a high task environment and the dismissal of which may result 
in an undesirable decision being made. 
Task load may also play a role in the negative effects of automation bias by 
individual's committing automation commission errors, i.e., errors made when an individual 
takes an inappropriate action due to over reliance on automated information or direction. As 
task load increases, individuals may rely more on automation, even in situations in which the 
automation may not be reliable. Skitka, Mosier and Burdick (1999), conducting a study 
involving the use of automated monitoring aids in situations where information presented 
may be unreliable, found that task load had an affect on whether individuals used system 
automation or not. As the demands of verifying the information increased, individuals 
decreased their verification efforts and used the systems automation more. In general, when 
30 
given a choice, individuals tend to prefer options that require lower investments in terms of 
attention and effort. Weick (1995) contends that as "arousal (i.e. workload) increases, people 
tend to abandon recently learned responses and categories and fall back on earlier, over 
learned, often simpler responses" (Weick, 1995:102). When individuals have come to trust 
system automation, and have come accustomed to using it, a high task load environment may 
cause them to overuse the automation even though it may not be reliable. 
Research Hypotheses 
The literature and studies on human-human trust relationships; human-computer 
relationships and human-computer trust relationships in adversarial relationships all provide 
possible trust models from which hypotheses may be proposed. The hypothesis proposed in 
this section are based on a model composed of relationships taken form Muir and Morray's 
(1996) dynamic model of trust, Llinas et al, (1998), lens model approach and Fields (2001) 
adapted model of trust and is depicted in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5:  Developed Trust and Use Model 
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In this model, dependability and predictability contribute to an individual's overall 
trust in a system's automation. System trust then leads to use of system automation. User 
task load acts as a moderating variable between system automation trust and automation use 
and was used to test the affect this construct has on a decision-makers use of available 
automation. With this model dependability is defined as having the trait of being 
dependable; yielding the same or compatible results in different experiments or statistical 
trials. Predictability is defined as the ability to foretell (declare or indicate in advance) on 
the basis of observation or experience. System automation trust is defined as having 
confidence in and to entrust the system automation to do the appropriate action.  Task load is 
defined to mean the level of workload of an individual throughout the course of the 
experimental simulation, (i.e. the number of resources an individual is responsible for and 
the number of enemy resources that need to be accounted for during the experiment 
simulation.) For the purpose of this study automation use is defined as the accomplishment 
of a task via system automation features in lieu of manual system techniques (i.e. using a 
system feature to accomplish many similar tasks simultaneously rather than completing each 
task individually in a more deliberate manner). 
Hypothesis Development 
The literature has demonstrated that trust is a multidimensional and dynamic 
construct that changes over time (Muir, 1987; Muir, 1994; Remple, Holmes & Zanna, 1985). 
Trust starts with the foundation of predictability built on observable factors, which 
demonstrated over time lead to a perception of dependability. In the latter stages, because 
one cannot determine dependability of future behavior that has not been exhibited, trust 
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depends on a leap of faith. In human-computer relationships, faith is based on the past 
perceived predictability and dependability (Lee and Morray, 1992; Muir and Morray, 1996; 
Muir, 1987). In an information warfare environment, it appears intuitive that observable and 
situational indications of IW activities would decrease the perception of predictability and 
dependability. Therefore, the following is predicted: 
Hypothesis 1: Perceptions of predictability of system automation will be 
positively correlated with ratings of trust. 
Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of dependability of an automated information system 
will be positively correlated with ratings of trust. 
Individual users who trust technology are more inclined to utilize it for the purpose 
and in the manner in which it was designed (Muir, 1987; Lee and Moray, 1994; Seong, 
Llinas, Dury and Bisantz, 1999). The introduction of automated technology has changed the 
roles of human operators from that of direct computer control to management of differing 
levels of computer control. Individuals must know how to interact with system automation, 
know when to rely on it and know when to intervene in the process when it is suspect 
(Seong, Bisantz, 1998). Sheridan (1980) emphasizes that an individual's trust in automation 
plays a key role in determining the level of reliance a user places on automation. It has been 
demonstrated that low trust in automation delays it use (Riley, 1996). This study therefore, 
proposes the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Trust in system automation will be positively correlated with use 
of system automation. 
Even if hypothesis 3 holds, there may be circumstances that automation use will not 
decline even when trust in the system automation is suspect. One of these circumstances 
may be that of user task load. As the task load increases and more environmental cues are 
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being interjected into the environment, the individual may begin to resort to using the 
automation as a means of keeping up with the environment. The increased task load may be 
causing a decreased state of situational awareness and thus environmental cues, such as 
information warfare indicators, may be forgotten or ignored (Weick, 1995). Based on the 
above, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 4: User task load will have a moderating effect on the relationship 
between system automation trust and use of system automation. 
Summary 
In summary, the goal of this research is to examine an individual's trust in system 
automation and subsequent use of that automation and to determine if automation use is 
affected by the decision-makers task load in a naturalistic decision-making environment. To 
examine these effects, an experimental design, based on the model presented in this chapter, 
is presented in the next chapter. Chapter III will operationalize the constructs presented in 
this chapter and present a methodology that was used to capture data pertinent to test the 
hypotheses presented herein. Finally, the methodology incorporates the characteristics 
necessary to create a naturalistic military decision-making environment. 
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HL      Methodology 
Overview 
The first chapter of this thesis described the research problem being investigated in 
this study. The second chapter provided a review of pertinent literature relating to the 
human-information system trust relationship within the context of an adversarial environment 
from which a model on system trust and automation use was developed. In addition, a set of 
hypotheses was offered to predict user trust and automation use in varying situations. This 
third chapter describes the methodology used in an experiment to test the hypotheses, 
operationalizes the constructs of interest, and defines a set of variables that were used to 
measure each construct. Finally, the data collection process is described, along with the 
statistical methods that were used to make inferences about the data. 
Experiment Method 
In order to investigate an individual's trust and subsequent use of automation, an 
experiment was designed around a military command and control (C2) scenario that was 
used with a high-fidelity computer simulation, the AWACS Weapons Director Trainer 
(AWDT) developed by 21st Century Systems, Inc. This system allows subjects to be 
immersed into a military C2 micro-world. Computer simulations provide a conduit between 
laboratory and field experiments by providing a more realistic and natural environment. The 
use of micro-world simulations provides for greater experimental control. Despite being 
conducted in a laboratory setting, the AWDT system simulates a real-world decision-making 
environment that may be experienced by weapons directors on board E-3 Airborne Warning 
and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Several crews aboard the AWACS coordinate their 
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efforts to provide airborne surveillance, and command, control and communications 
functions for tactical and air defense forces. Weapons directors are responsible for directing 
airborne assets, detecting, identifying, tracking and intercepting airborne threats, as well as 
conducting search and rescue missions, should the need arise. The AWDT system allows for 
the collection of quantitative measures over the course of each experimental session as well 
as providing a mechanism for collecting measurable attitudes an beliefs through survey 
questionnaires. The system also has the capability to capture and record actions of 
participants as well as measure an individual's task load throughout a simulation session. 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 40 Air Force Institute of Technology graduate students with 
military ranks of 2nd Lieutenant through Major along with Junior and Senior members of the 
Air Force ROTC detachment at Wright State University, with education levels ranging from, 
undergraduate to graduate. Both female and male participants participated. A majority of 
participants liked using computers and were comfortable with their use in the Air Force. All 
participants indicated in the Post Simulation Evaluation Sheet (see Appendix E), that the 
training provided was sufficient to use the system and that the simulation was easy to 
understand. In addition, over half the participants indicated verbally that they would like to 
"play the game again." These comments were in line with the experimenter's observation 
that all subjects appeared engaged during the treatment scenarios. All participants arrived in 




An experiment was designed as a between-group experiment that manipulated two 
independent variables, Information Warfare and User Task Load. Implied IW will provide 
an environment in which system automation will be in question, thus providing a basis for 
potential decreased trust in the system automation. These variables were completely crossed 
in a 2 x 2 design configuration as shown in Figure 6 below. Each participant experienced 






















Figure 6:  Experimental Group Configurations 
Each participant was given training on the simulator concept and computer interface. 
A further description of the training is presented in the Task and Procedures section of this 
chapter. After completion of training, each participant was tasked to perform a hidden- 
profile, decision-making task that involved controlling multiple aircraft types to defend an 
area of operation and attack when possible in a simulated battle space. Control of the aircraft 
types was performed through various user actions on the AWDT system. The AWDT system 
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was described to the subjects as a new AWACS component undergoing initial testing by Air 
Force Research Laboratories. 
Subjects were tasked to direct air assets against enemy assets with the aim of 
eliminating all threats in the area of operation. In addition, subjects had the opportunity to 
attack enemy positions as resources allowed. Subjects had the option to direct their assets 
using manual controls or to accept system recommendations that then automatically direct 
their assets. Manual direction of assets requires a minimum of three mouse clicks and 
manual positioning using the mouse. Automatic direction of assets could be accomplished 
by either clicking each visual representation of the current recommendations within an 
allotted time frame or by clicking a menu item that will accept all current active 
recommendations, (i.e., more that one recommendation can be accepted at a time.) 
Subjects were told that system recommendations are derived from sophisticated 
algorithms designed with the aid of experienced AWACS Weapon Directors. Subjects can 
assume that recommendations are designed to best utilize existing resources while attempting 
to eliminate the highest occurring threat. Subjects were told that they could view their scores 
at anytime during the scenario. Scores were generated automatically by the system by taking 
the weighted sum of all eliminated enemy assets minus the weighted sum of the subject's 
assets destroyed. A positive score indicates that the value of enemy resources destroyed is 
greater than the value of the subject's resources destroyed while a negative score indicates 
the opposite. 
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Equipment and Environment 
All experiment sessions were conducted in an office with no windows and a single 
entrance. Each subject performed his task in a designated workspace in which he was unable 
to see another's computer display unless he turned to look at it. Each subject's workspace 
consisted of a chair, a desk surface, and a PC computer with Pentium II 350 MHZ processor, 
500 Meg of RAM, the Windows 2000 Professional operating system, and a 19-inch color 
monitor. Each system was loaded with the AWDT system software. Also included were 
quick-reference sheets, posted on the wall in front of the participants, that defined system 
icons and provided information about the values of all resources depicted in the simulation. 
Task and Procedures 
Experimental sessions were conducted over a four-week period in which the 40 
participants participated in one of four treatment groups. Each experimental session lasted 
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Figure 7: Experimental Time-Line 
On their scheduled day (picked by the subjects themselves from various two-hour 
blocks throughout a four week period), subjects were instructed to report to the evaluation 
area located in AFIT Bldg 640, room 274. Subjects were assigned to a treatment group and 
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operator position based on a randomized block design (see Appendix G) based on the order 
in which they arrived. Upon arrival, each subject was asked to sign a login sheet and 
directed to an operator position. An experiment package was provided to each subject, part 
of which included a standard consent form and a biometric data collection form (see 
Appendix A). During the first five minutes, subjects were asked to fill out these two forms 
before training began. 
The experiment facilitator (reading from a script) started the session by explaining the 
fictional purpose of the experiment (to evaluate some human factors issues regarding a new 
piece of software for the AWACS aircraft). Next, the facilitator went through a PowerPoint 
training presentation (see Appendix H) on a desktop PC located in the room. Following the 
PowerPoint training session, subjects were given the opportunity to ask questions. The 
experiment facilitator then started the first training simulation and instructed the subjects to 
focus on practicing the actions learned during training and not be concentrating on getting a 
good score. Subjects, if necessary, were individually shown how to perform the various 
functions needed to operate the system. The experiment facilitator freely answered any 
questions during this time. This first training simulation lasted approximately 15 minutes. 
Following the first training simulation, the subjects were allowed a five-minute break while 
the experiment facilitator reset the system for the next training session. After the break, the 
experiment facilitator provided additional training via a PowerPoint presentation. During 
this session subjects were introduced to the agent recommendation functions available in the 
AWDT system. Following this brief period of instruction, the experiment facilitator again 
answered any questions and then started the second and final training simulation, which 
lasted 15 minutes. Again, the experiment facilitator provided assistance to subjects on proper 
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system operation and game play rules. Following this second training session, subjects were 
given the system automation trust survey to complete (See Appendix B.) They were 
instructed to put the completed form in the blue folders provided at each station. They were 
then allowed to take another 5-minute break. 
Following the break, the experiment facilitator instructed the subjects to read the 
appropriate scenario brief (see Appendices C & D) and wait for further instructions. Subjects 
were instructed to raise their hands to request assistance if they encountered a computer 
malfunction or procedural question during the simulation. Subjects were also instructed to 
remain at their workstation at the completion of the experiment until otherwise directed by 
the experimental facilitator. Once all subjects indicated they were ready to begin, the 
facilitator started the final simulation and instructed the subjects to begin. 
When the simulation ended the experiment facilitator passed out the second trust 
survey (same as the first one) and instructed the subjects to complete it and place it into the 
folder at their station and wait until all of the other subjects were finished. Once all subjects 
were finished, the experiment facilitator revealed the true purpose of the experiment. 
Participants were instructed not to discuss the experiment with others planning to participate. 
Experiment Manipulations 
The first experimental manipulation was the construct called Information Warfare 
(IW). It has been shown that indications of IW may reduce the level of trust individuals have 
in the automated system they are using (Bisantz et al., 2000; Fields 2001). IW was 
operationalized by planting the idea of IW in the minds of participants via the scenario 
description. The scenario revealed that the system had been down for a time due to an IW 
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attack, but presently the system was up and working but the reliability of systems 
recommendations were in question (see Appendix C for full scenario ). Treatment groups two 
and four were subjected to the IW manipulation during the simulation. Groups one and three 
read a similar scenario, but no IW or equipment problems were indicated (see Appendix D 
for full scenario). 
The second manipulation, User Task Load, was operationalized by increasing the 
number of resources a participant was responsible for, along with the number of resources 
used by the attacking force. Task load was increased by a factor of approximately 2.5. 
Treatment groups one and two were subjected to a low task load, while treatment groups 
three and four were subjected to high task loads. The load measure file, automatically 
generated during the simulation, verified the task load of the individuals. Of the 20 
individuals in the low-task load groups, 90 % indicated, on the Post Simulation Evaluation 
Sheet (see Appendix E), that they felt the scenario was low-task load, while, of the 20 
individuals in the high-task load groups, 85 % indicated they felt the scenario was high task 
load. 
Hypothesis Measures 
In Chapter II a set of hypotheses was developed suggesting that the constructs of, 
system predictability and dependability would affect users' perceived level of trust in a 
system's automation, and that the perceived level of trust would impact their subsequent use 
of the system's automation. In addition, it was hypothesized that an increase in user task 
load would have a moderating effect on the relationship between automation trust and user 
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use of system automation. This section explains the procedures and instruments used to 
measure and collect data relating to these different constructs of interest. 
Because cognitive phenomena like attitudes, motivations, expectations, intentions, 
and preferences are difficult to observe, a questionnaire (see appendix B) was used to 
measure the specific constructs of interest including trust, predictability, and dependability. 
This questionnaire is a derivative of one obtained from researchers at the University of South 
Florida (USF) which was developed specifically for the use of measuring the above 
mentioned constructs, as well as others, by actual weapons directors using the AWDT 
system. Credibility of the original questionnaire from USF was established using a Q-Sort 
analysis using six subject matter experts. The reliability analysis produced an alpha = .75 for 
predictability and .85 for trust. Dependability had no associated alpha, as it is a single item 
(Hoffman, 2000). All constructs were measured on a 6 pt. Likert-type scale in an attempt to 
force agreement or disagreement with each item and avoid neutrality. The scale ranged from 
1 (Very Strongly Disagree) on the left to 6 (Very Strongly Agree) on the right. Questions 
one through seven dealt with the construct of trust, questions eight through ten dealt with the 
construct of predictability, and question eleven dealt with the construct of dependability. The 
survey was administered after the second training session and again after the final 
experimental simulation. The survey administered after the second training session served as 
a baseline to measure the overall trust individuals placed in the system's automation before 
any treatment was applied. 
Automation use was measured by determining the number of times a subject accepted 
system recommendations vs. the number of recommendations issued. The act of depending 
largely on the system may be an indicator and measure of trusting behavior. The AWDT 
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system allows for the collection of this measure through automated data capture. The system 
can provide information on the number of recommendations given, whether the 
recommendations were accepted, and the manner in which they were accepted, (i.e., an 
individual recommendation was accepted or a group of recommendations were accepted.) 
Analysis of the data collected during the experimental session was done through a 
variety of parametric statistical analyses methods. Pearson correlation analysis was 
performed to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, while analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to 
investigate the difference in automation use between the environmental conditions of IW and 
Non-IW (high and low trust environments) as well as between the various participant task 
loads. In addition, ANOVA was used to determine if user task load has a moderating effect 
on the relationship between system automation trust and use of system automation. 
Summary 
This chapter described a research method to investigate the theorized relationship 
between system automation trust and automation use as well as the theorized effect of the 
moderating variable of task load on this relationship. It described the experimental 
methodology, along with the operationalized constructs and a set of variables that were used 
to measure those operationalized constructs. Finally, this chapter briefly described the 
methods used to analyze the data collected during the experimental sessions. 
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IV.      Analysis Of Data 
Data Analysis 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data (see appendix F) collected during the 
experiment described in Chapter III. The results of the information presented here, in 
relation to the research hypotheses, are presented in Chapter V. Correlation analysis was 
performed to statistically determine if relationships exit between perceptions of 
dependability, predictability and perceptions of trust in terms of system automation. In 
addition, correlation analysis was used to statistically determine if a relationship exists 
between perceptions of trust in automation and automation use. Finally, ANOVA was used 
to determine if user task load has a moderating effect on the relationship between system 
automation trust and use of system automation. Parametric statistical methods were used 
based on the assumption of normality of the data. The normality assumption is based on the 
graphical evidence presented in Figure 8 below. This figure presents two normal probability 
plots of the residual values (original value - estimate of the mean for each treatment group) 
from the initial and post-treatment trust questionnaire data. The straightness of the pattern in 
each of the plots provides strong support to the normality assumption (Devore, 2000). The 
parametric analysis methods used were: Pearson Correlations, Cronbach's Alpha, and 
ANOVA with a Tukey's multiple comparison. Cronbach's Alpha was used to evaluate the 
agreement in the perceived way the groups ranked the constructs in question. 
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Relationship between predictability, dependability, and trust in system automation (HI, 
H2) 
Hypothesis HI predicts a positive correlation between perceptions of predictability of 
system automation with perceptions of trust in system automation, while hypothesis H2 
predicts a positive correlation between perceptions of dependability of system automation 
with perceptions of trust in system automation. A review of the correlation analysis in Table 
2 shows a statistically significant and strong positive correlation between perceived 
predictability and trust, and between perceived dependability and trust, both at a significance 
level of a < 0.01. Values are shown for both pre-and post-treatment measures. Table 3 
below presents a Cronbach's Alpha analysis and shows strong (alpha > .7) consistency of 
response in the measurements of trust and predictability (Sail et al., 2001). No Cronbach's 
analysis was accomplished for dependability due to the single question asked regarding this 
construct. 
Table 2: Correlation Analysis for 
Predictability and Dependability vs. Trust 












































In addition to the Cronbach's Alpha analysis, a factor analysis was completed on the 
questionnaire data and verified two constructs were measured; trust and predictability, as was 
desired. The findings above support both Hypothesis 1 and 2 and suggest that as ratings of 
perceived predictability and dependability in system automation rise, so too, do ratings of 
trust in system automation. 
Relationship between system automation trust and system automation use (H3) 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that an individual's perception of trust in system automation 
will be positively correlated with his use of system automation. Automation use was 
measured as a ratio between the number of system recommendations given and the number 
of recommendations accepted by an individual. The higher the ratio, the greater the 
automation was used. A review of the correlation analysis presented in Figure 10 and Table 
4 shows a statistically significant and strong positive correlation between ratings of trust in 
system automation and automation use at a significance level a < 0.01 using post-treatment 
trust and automation measures. This finding supports Hypothesis 3 and suggests that as a 
user's perception of trust in system automation increases so will his use ofthat system's 
automation. 
Table 4: Correlation Analysis for Trust vs. Automation Use 
Construct Pearson Correlation 
r-value 
Trust Vs. Automation Use .6839 
Significant at p = .01 
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Figure 10: Scatter Plot of Trust vs. Automation Use 
Moderating effect of user task load on the relationship between system automation trust 
and system automation use (H4) 
Hypothesis 4 predicts a user's task load will have a moderating effect on the 
relationship between system trust and his use of system automation. The parametric results 
shown below in Figures 11,12 and 13 provide evidence that task load has a moderating 
effect on the relationship between trust and automation use at a significant level of a < .05. 
Figures 11 and 12 are ANOVA plots with associated Tukey's Multiple Comparison results 
showing the mean trust levels of each treatment group before and after treatments were 
applied. Figure 11 indicates all participants show a high level of system automation trust 









| Oneway Anova | Means Comparisons 
Summary of Fit 
Rsquare 
Adj Rsquare 
Root Mean Square Error 
Mean of Response 







2 0.000000       0.290000 
3 -0.29       0.000000 
1 -0.3 -0.01 










| Analysis of Variance                                                                                               | 
Source                             DF    Su n of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Profa> F 
Treatment Group              3 0.780750 0.260250 0.7834 0.5110 
Error                                36 11.959000 0.332194 
C. Total                           39 12.739750 
| Means for Oneway Anova I 
Comparisons for each pair using Student's t 
Level      Number Mean    Std Error    Lower95% 
1 10      4.99000      0.18226 4.6204 
2 10       5.29000      0.18226 4.9204 
3 10       5.00000      0.18226 4.6304 
4 10       4.93000      0.18226 4.5604 


























Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
Figure 11: Descriptive Statistics of Pre-Treatment Trust Measures 
However, the evidence shown in figure 12 below, does allow for the claim that treatments 1 
and 3 are statistically significantly different from treatments 2 and 4 in their associated mean 
values of system automation trust. That is to say, the treatments in which information 
provided was not in question (i.e., non-IW) are significantly different from the treatments in 















| Oneway Anova 
| Summary of Fit 1 
Rsquare 0.520801 
Adj Rsquare 0.480868 
Root Mean Square E ror 0.687911 
Mean of Response 4.135 
Observations (or Su nWgts ) 40 
| Analysis of Variance 
Source DF s Jin of Squares MeanSquare F Ratio Prob > F 
Treatment Group 3 18.515000 6.17167 13.0418 <.0001 
Error 36 17.036000 0.47322 
C. Total 39 35.551000 
| Means for Onewa y An ova I 
Means Comparisons 
Dif=Mean[ij-Mean[j] 
3                    12 4 
3 0.00000       0.18000       1.36000 1.52000 
1 -0.18000      0.00000       1.18000 1.34000 
2 -1.36000     -1.18000      0.00000 0.16000 
4 -1.52000     -1.34000     -0.16000 0.00000 
Level      Number           Mean    Std Error    Lower 95% Upper95% 
1 10       4.72000     0.21754              4.2788 5.1612 
2 10       3.54000     0.21754              3.0988 3.9812 
3 10       4.90000     0.21754              4.4588 5.3412 
4 10       3.38000     0.21754               2.9388 3.8212 





all pairs us ngTukey-K amer HS 
Abs(Dif)-LSD 
3 1 2 4 
3      -0.82855 -0.64855 0.53145 0.69145 
1       -0.64855 -0.82855 0.35145 0.51145 
2        0.53145 0.35145 -0.82855 -0.66855 
4        0.69145 0.51145 -0.66855 -0.82855 
■alues show pairs of means that a 
Figure 12:  Descriptive Statistics of Post-Treatment Trust Measure 
This information taken together with the results of hypothesis 3, which suggests that 
trust and automation use are positively correlated, could lead one to conclude that the levels 
of automation use between treatment groups 1 and 3 and between treatment groups 2 and 4 
would show no statistically significant difference. Figure 12 below, shows that there is 
indeed no statistically significant difference in automation use between treatment groups 1 
and 3, (high trust groups) but does show a statistically significant difference, although minor, 
between groups 2 and 4 (low trust groups). In should be noted that the confidence level for 
the entire set of comparison means is 95% (alpha of .05), but the confidence level for any 
particular comparison (i.e., treatment 2 and 4) is larger than 95% as the Tukey method uses 
an experiment-wise error rate rather than a pre-comparison error rate (Devore, 2000). 
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1                          2                         3 4 All Pairs 
Tukey-Kramer 
Treatment Group 0.05 
| Means Comparisons 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] 
3                    14                     2 
I 1 Onewav Anova i 
| Summary of Fit i 
Rsquare 0.609655 3      0.000000     0.017210     0.223600     0.423080 
Adj Rsquare 0.577126 1       -0.01721     0.000000     0.206390     0.405870 
Root Mean Square Error 0.145543 4        -0.2236     -0.20639     0.000000     0.199480 
Mean of Response 0.675258 2      -0.42308     -0.40587      -0.19948     0.000000 
Observations (or Sum Wgfs )                40 
Alpha= 0.05 | Analysis of Variance I 
Source                                 DF 
Treatment Group             3 
Sum of Squares    Mean Square          F Ratio     Prob > F 
1.1910235            0.397008       18.7420         <.0001 
Comparisons for a!! pairs usingTukey-Kramer HSD 
Error                                   36 
C. Total                              39 




3                    14                     2 | Means for Oneway Anova                                                  | 
Level      Number          Mear Std Error    Lower 95%      Upper 95% 3        -0.1753     -0.15809     0.048301      0.247781 
1                        10    0.824020      0.04602            0.73068          0.91736 1       -0.15809        -0.1753     0.031091      0.230571 
2                        10    0.418150      0.04602            0.32481           0.51149 4      0.048301      0.031091         -0.1753     0.024181 
3                        10    0.841230      0.04602            0.74789          0.93457 2      0.247781      0.230571      0.024181         -0.1753 
4                        10    0.617630      0.04602            0.52429          0.71097 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
Figure 13: Descriptive Statistics of Post-Treatment Automation Use 
These findings support Hypothesis 4 and suggest that despite perceptions of low system 
automation trust, individuals tend to use automation more when task load s increased. 
Conclusion 
The findings from this chapter show some significant results and are discussed in the 
next chapter concerning the experimental hypotheses. In addition, Chapter V will provide an 
overview of the research findings, present some limitations associated with this research, 
discuss implications for the Air Force, and offer suggestions for follow-on research. 
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V.       Findings 
Introduction 
Automation in computer systems provides humans with a great deal of assistance in 
carrying out the responsibilities of our everyday lives. However, our willingness to use and 
trust this automation constrains its use. This research looked at the interactions between 
humans and computer automation and the effects the humans' perceptions of trust played in 
the way they utilized this automation. It also looked at how workload affected the 
relationship between trust and system automation use. This chapter examines the findings 
from the data analysis of the experiment described in Chapter III with respect to the research 
hypotheses offered in Chapter II. Next, implications for the Air Force are presented to 
include areas of further research. Finally, limitations of the research experiment are 
presented. 
The research question for this study was to understand how an individual's trust in a 
computer system's automation affects his use of the system's automation and to examine 
what effects user task load has on his use of automation in an environment in which trust 
level is degraded; i.e., an IW environment. Four hypotheses were developed in Chapter II 
and tested in the experiment described in Chapter III. The conclusions of each of these 
research questions are presented below: 
Perceptions of predictability and dependability of system automation will be positively 
correlated with ratings of trust (Hl, H2) 
Trust in computer automation, similar to human-human trust, is thought to be 
composed of many factors, two of which are predictability and dependability. This 
relationship was established in Muir and Morray's (1996) dynamic model of trust. As such, 
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predictability and dependability are hypothesized to be associated with trust of automation. 
This research showed that this appears to be the case. As ratings of predictability and 
dependability rise, so do ratings of trust. This relationship between predictability, 
dependability, and trust provide support for earlier work mentioned above by Muir and 
Morray (1996) indicating that predictability and dependability are components of trust. In 
addition, the results showed a slightly stronger correlation in both components in the post- 
treatment measures. This is in line with the notion that trust, even in human-machine 
relationships, is developed and strengthened over time. Results also support the notion that 
when an individual perceives unreliability in automation, his trust in that automation will 
decrease. 
Trust in system automation will be positively correlated with use of system automation 
(H3) 
Previous research in the use of technology and system automation found that an 
individual's use of a system's automation depended on his perceived reliability of the system, 
or trust in the system's automation (Zanna, 1985; Muir and Morray 1996). The results of this 
research add support to this notion as seen in the high positive correlation between perceived 
trust and system automation use. In the cases in which unreliability, in the form of indicated 
information warfare activities, was injected into the treatment scenarios, trust in the systems 
automation was significantly reduced. All individuals in the two treatment groups in which 
IW was indicated answered, "yes," to a post scenario question asking if the scenario 
indicated IW activities while no individuals in the non-IW treatment groups answered, "yes." 
This reduced level of trust resulted in a corresponding reduced level of automation use in 
these groups. This result, contrary to previous research (Fields, 2001), also suggests that 
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information warfare activities, by influencing the reliability of a system's performance, may 
result in lowering the trust an individual places in that system and thus, his subsequent use of 
the system's automation may be diluted. This condition may be desired, as over-trust in a 
system or system's functions during times of unreliability may result in an increased 
frequency of commission errors producing undesirable results. 
User task load will have a moderating effect on the relationship between system 
automation trust and use of system automation (H4) 
The analysis from the experiment provides support for the notion that task load has a 
moderating affect on the positive relationship between automation trust and automation use. 
In other words, in high task load situations, individuals were more prone to use system 
automation despite a lower level of system automation trust caused by unreliability in the 
system automation. This behavior is consistent with that found by Skitka, Mosier and 
Burdick (1996) and Wiekins (1994). In the low task load, unreliable information scenario, 
individuals had more time to maintain their situational awareness and make a more informed, 
deliberate decision using manual targeting methods. As task load was increased and the 
situation become more urgent, the completeness and accuracy of the individual's situational 
awareness may have decreased. This may have caused the individual to abandon the more 
complete and deliberate manual targeting technique favored by the low task load group in 
favor of the faster automated techniques in order to maintain a feel of control over the 
situation. 
55 
Research Finding Overview 
As predicted, there is evidence to suggest the factors of perceived predictability and 
dependability in a system's automation are positively correlated with ratings of trust in the 
system's automation, and that this associated level of trust is positively correlated with the 
level of system automation use by an individual. Therefore, in order to encourage the use of 
system automation and provide the potential for decreased decision time for decision makers, 
system designers and developers must provide systems that provide a high level of system 
predictability and dependability. 
There also appears to be evidence to suggest that task load may play an important role 
in modifying the level of use of system automation when trust in the automation is low, such 
as in conditions in which information warfare activities are or have been occurring. This 
finding may be significant in military settings in which commission errors caused by overuse 
of automation in unreliable situations may cause grave results. 
Implications 
Implications of findings are considered in two areas: research and application. In 
regards to research, the findings in this study are encouraging enough to continue this stream 
of research. As the overall size of the Air Force workforce decreases, automation may be 
used to offset the decrease in personnel and possibly put an increasing workload on the 
remaining individuals. It would be beneficial to determine a suitable range within which an 
individual can maintain an appropriate level of situational awareness so factors such as 
unreliability of system automation remain part of the decision maker's environmental cues 
used to make critical decisions. This suitable-range theory could be accomplished in future 
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research by varying the workload over time and seeing how the same individual reacts in the 
different reliability scenarios. Because this study dealt with inexperienced individuals in 
regards to weapons directors duties, it would be important to determine if these results hold 
true for actual weapons directors in a more realistic environment. Experience level and 
confidence in one's own abilities have been shown to affect the level of trust an individual 
places in a system and plays a role in the type and amount of automation an individual uses 
(Lee and Morray, 1994). 
Past research has shown that trust is a dynamic construct and that once lost can be 
regained over time (Seong et al., 1998). Because environmental conditions can reduce the 
level of perceived system trust, and therefore, system automation use, further research is 
necessary in this area to investigate what actions can facilitate the regaining of an individuals 
trust in the system once perceived trust is reduced. 
Applications of this research may be useful in developing offensive information 
warfare tactics. First, tactics could be developed to take advantage of the reduced level of 
perceived trust in a system caused by uncertainty of the environment. A perceived IW 
attack, whether actual or not, upon our adversary could force a decreased level of trust by 
their operators on their own system and its automation capabilities. This could increase their 
decision time, or OODA loop, and provide an increased advantage to our own decision 
makers. In addition, if through subterfuge, one is able to affect an adversaries system such 
that its automation capability provided erroneous results, the increased task load may cause a 
higher occurrence of automation commission errors by the adversary due to overuse of the 
unreliable system automation, at least until the erroneous results are discovered. 
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From a defensive standpoint, operational protocols could be developed such that in times of 
uncertainty, increasing personnel to limit the effects of over-use of system automation could 
reduce individual workload. Also, it may be possible to maintain an individual's situational 
awareness regarding uncertainty in a system's performance by providing on-screen 
indications of the uncertainty and system reliability. These cues may help reduce the amount 
of automation use by individuals and thus, fewer commission errors would be committed. 
Research Limitations 
Despite the evidence in support of these results, certain limitations must be 
acknowledged when considering these findings. First, in regards to design and internal 
validity issues, repeated testing and instrumentation may be a threat to the internal validity. 
The same trust measurement questionnaire was given immediately before and immediately 
after the treatment scenario. This may have led at least some of the to answer trust questions 
based on their previous answers realizing that this was a test me asure and they wanted to be 
consistent. 
In consideration of external validity and generalizability issues, the population, 
military culture, and education level in which experiment subjects were drawn from may not 
be representative of the larger overall military population and even less representative of the 
civilian population. All but one of the experiment participants indicated they liked using 
computers for work and 90% indicated they felt comfortable with the role of computers in 
the Air Force. The setting in which the experiment was conducted may also lesson the 
external validity of this experiment. The somewhat sterile and unrealistic laboratory setting 
may have detracted from the desire to instill a command and control atmosphere and may 
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have resulted in less effective manipulations. In addition, due to equipment limitations, there 
was no way for actual manipulation of the software to mimic realistic IW activities. Despite, 
meeting the minimal AWDT vendor system specifications, the computers used were not 
powerful enough to run in a client-server mode as originally desired. This mode would have 
allowed real-time information manipulation during the treatment scenario. Also, subjects 
had no experience with the typical duties of an AWACS weapons director. Therefore, their 
experience level in this unique command and control environment was solely provided by the 
training they received during the experiment. Lack of experience may have contributed to a 
higher level of trust and subsequent automation use in the two treatment groups in which 
information provided was said to be reliable. 
In regards to the trust measurement instrument used bias may have been introduced 
into the questionnaire due to the sequential nature of the questions. The first seven questions 
dealt with trust, the next three dealt with predictability, and the last dealt with dependability. 
In the future, if a similar questionnaire is used, questions should be reordered such that 
constructs are not measured in a sequential manner but rather in a random fashion. 
Last, despite the strong support for normality, the analyses suffered from a small 
sample size and thus a lack of power to detect small effects. This is not an uncommon 
consequence of this type of field research due to cost and time in securing larger sample sizes 
from a border population. However, this does make significant findings more valuable when 
considering the implications. In addition, because this research is making claims against 
theory rather than generalizations to a larger population, the small sample size is not as 
significant a factor. 
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Summary 
There appears to be evidence to suggest an individual's use of a system's automation 
capability is directly and positively related to the level of perceived trust the individual places 
in that system's automation. In addition, an individual's task load may have a moderating 
affect on the relationship between user trust and automation such that, during times of 
increased task load, an individual may resort to using the system automation despite a lower 
level of perceived trust in the system's automation. These results have important 
implications for the United States Air Force in that overuse of our automation capabilities by 
individuals may cause the increased occurrence of automation commission errors causing 
undesired and possibly catastrophic effects. In addition, the results indicate possible benefits 
in the area of offensive information warfare tactics. If tactics can be developed and 
implemented upon our adversaries to take advantage of the effects caused by a decreased 
level of trust in system automation and the overuse caused by increased workload, we could 
see an increase in an adversary's OODA loop and an increase in their commission of 
automation commission errors. Further research is warranted and should draw upon the 
results presented here while improving upon the mentioned limitations. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet 
Participant Information Sheet (Form 2) Participant ID# _____ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is a short two-part survey to determine the demographic information of the 
participants in this research as well as their experience level with computer systems. The 
data collected will be used to aid in the evaluation of the results of the simulation. All 
information provided will be kept confidential and will not be able to be traced back to the 
participant. 
SECTION 1 - Demographic Information 
1. Age  
2. Rank _________ 
3. Service (USAF, Army, Navy) _________________ 
4. AFSC  
5. Are you currently in ROTC __________ 
6. Number of years served in current AFSC  
7. Total number of years served in the military _________ 
8. Highest Level of Education (circle one): High School, Undergraduate, Graduate, 
Doctoral 
9. Operational experience in Combat/Hostile Duty Location (yes/no) ___________ 
SECTION II - Computer Experience an Attitudes (Circle One) 
1. Are you currently, or have you ever, worked in a computer communications position? Y 
N 
2. Do you consider yourself to be knowledgeable about computers? YN 
3. Are you familiar with how a computer network operates? Y N 
4. Are you familiar with any programming languages? Y N 
5. Which computer programs do you use on a frequent basis 
6. Do you like to use computers to conduct work? Y N 
7. Do you feel comfortable with the role computers play in today's Air Force?     Y    N 
Why or why not? 
61 
Appendix B: Automation Trust Survey 
Participant Questionnaire       (Form 3) Participant ID 
Please answer all of the questions below. Uses the scale provided and enter the number 
that best matches your beliefs. 
1 = Disagree Very Strongly 2 = Disagree Strongly 3 = 
Disagree 
4 = Agree 5 = Agree Strongly 6 = Agree Very Strongly 
1.   I trusted the agent's recommendations 
2.   I was cautious in relying on the agent's recommendations 
3.   The agent influenced my decisions 
4.   I was willing to accept the agent's recommendations during risky situations in the 
scenario 
5.   I was willing to accept agent recommendations during non-risky situations in the 
scenario 
6.   I would trust the agent to perform certain tasks on my behalf 
7.   I was willing to accept the agent's recommendations during uncertain situations in 
the scenario 
8.   The agent's recommendations were predictable 
9.   The agent provided consistent information 
10. The agent responded consistently to similar circumstances at different points in 
time 
11. The agent was dependable 
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Appendix C: Sample Scenario Brief 
BACKGROUND: 
You are a Weapons Director aboard an E-3 AWACS aircraft from the 960th Airborne 
Air Control Squadron recently deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in support of operation 
Enduring Freedom. Your aircraft has just arrived on station at 33,000 ft, just west of the 
Island country of Malta. You have complete communications capabilities with all U.S. and 
allied aircraft and ground units in the current area of operation, which includes all of the 
Mediterranean Sea around the islands of Gozo and Malta. 
Gozo 
Rabat 
Com in o 
Maita 




n             A              if MI 
.!                                         .                                        tit", 
THE PRESENT: Prior to takeoff, you received a crew briefing which included a standard 
Mission briefing, Intelligence briefing, and the current Rules of Engagement briefing. The 
following is a summary of the information you received. 
MISSION: 
Primary - Defend your assigned area of operation against any hostile enemy aircraft. 
Secondary - Attack enemy airbases and resources as friendly resources allow. 
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INTEL BRIEF: 
In response to the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the 
President, in coordination with the allied coalition has ordered the deployment of U.S. troops 
to areas around the world to include the Mediterranean Sea. In particular, U.S. Forces have 
been deployed, by invitation, to the island nation of Malta as a staging area for possible 
future military action in the war against terrorism. 
Due to the American and coalition campaign against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, Usama Bin Laden has called out to the Muslim world for a "Jihad" or "holy 
war" against the U.S and those adding us in our so called "quest for domination of the 
Muslim World." 
In response to this call, Islamic extremists based in Algeria, just south of Malta, along with 
skilled members of the Al Qaeda terrorist network have overrun the Algerian backed country 
of Gozo and have seized control of all their military assets. 
It is believed the extremists will attempt to use the Gozo air bases and aircraft for an 
all out suicide attack against American resources and American occupied airbases in the 
country of Malta. It is known that the Gozo military assets include Russian-made fighters, 
bombers, tankers as well as surface-to-air missile batteries. 
Members of the Al Qaeda terrorist network are believed to be well trained in the art 
of information warfare. The CIA indicates many have been trained by the Peoples Republic 
of China's Information Warfare Force (IWF) and that the IWF has, in the past, sold some of 
its advanced electronic hacking equipment to the Al Qaeda. 
EQUIPMENT STATUS: All systems up and running. Weapons Director system was down 
for a short time but is now back on line. It appears there has been an information warfare 
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attack on the system through the data and sensor uplink protocol. All indications are that 
graphical display send and receive algorithms are working correctly. The algorithms that 
affect the agent tool recommendations seem to have been the target of the attack. System 
testing has shown an approximate 15% decrease in the effectiveness and reliability of the 
recommendations. 
Problem is being worked. 
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: By the order of the President of the United States, all US 
military forces are authorized to use deadly force to interdict hostile aircraft from entering 
Malta airspace and to execute offensive strikes against all military capable targets on the 
island of Gozo. 
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Appendix D: Sample Scenario Brief 
BACKGROUND: 
You are a Weapons Director aboard an E-3 AW ACS aircraft from the 960th Airborne 
Air Control Squadron recently deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in support of operation 
Enduring Freedom. Your aircraft has just arrived on station at 33,000 ft, just west of the 
Island country of Malta. You have complete communications capabilities with all U.S. and 
allied aircraft and ground units in the current area of operation, which includes all of the 









n            <1             öKin 
n w nt; 
THE PRESENT: Prior to takeoff, you received a crew briefing which included a standard 
Mission briefing, Intelligence briefing, and the current Rules of Engagement briefing. The 
following is a summary of the information you received. 
MISSION: 
Primary - Defend your assigned area of operation against any hostile enemy aircraft. 
Secondary - Attack enemy airbases and resources as friendly resources allow. 
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INTEL BRIEF: 
In response to the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the 
President, in coordination with the allied coalition has ordered the deployment of U.S. troops 
to areas around the world to include the Mediterranean Sea. In particular, U.S. Forces have 
been deployed, by invitation, to the island nation of Malta as a staggering area for possible 
future military action in the war against terrorism. 
Due to the American and coalition campaign against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, Usama Bin Laden has called out to the Muslim world for a "Jihad" or "holy 
war" against the U.S and those adding us in our so called "quest for domination of the 
Muslim World." 
In response to this call, Islamic extremists based in Algeria, just south of Malta, along with 
skilled members of the Al Qaeda terrorist network have overrun the Algerian backed country 
of Gozo and have seized control of all their military assets. 
It is believed the extremists will attempt to use the Gozo air bases and aircraft fo r an 
all out suicide attack against American resources and American occupied airbases in the 
country of Malta. It is known that the Gozo military assets include Russian-made fighters, 
bombers, tankers as well as surface-to-air missile batteries. 
EQUIPMENT STATUS: All systems up and running. 
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:  By the order of the President of the United States, all US 
military forces are authorized to use deadly force to interdict hostile aircraft from entering 
Malta airspace and to execute offensive strikes against all military capable targets on the 
island of Gozo. 
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Appendix E: Post Simulation Evaluation Sheet 
Post Simulation Evaluation Sheet (Form 5) Participant # ______ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is a short survey to assess the participant's reaction to the simulation. Please circle the 
correct answer. 
1. Were the instructions clear and understandable? Y N 
2. Was the simulation easy to understand? Y N 
3. Was the training sufficient for you to play the game? Y N 
4. Did you encounter any difficulties in following the instructions for the game?   Y N 
5. Was the game's operations tempo too fast? Y N 
6. What did you perceive the workload as: High   or Low 
7. Was Information Warfare activity indicated in your scenario? Y N 
Thank you for participating in this research. Your inputs are extremely valuable. 
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5.6 5.3 6.0 6.0 4.0 3.0 0.80 0.20 0.6 1.28 
4.6 6.0 6.0 4.7 5.7 6.0 0.81 0.08 -0.4 -0.01 
4.0 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.82 0.06 -1.0 -0.72 
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 0.79 0.08 -1.0 -0.58 
4.7 5.0 5.0 3.4 3.0 4.0 0.63 0.08 -0.3 -1.29 
5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.0 4.0 0.95 0.07 0.2 0.14 
6.0 5.7 6.0 4.0 4.7 3.0 0.66 0.06 1.0 -0.72 
4.6 4.7 5.0 5.0 4.7 5.0 0.81 0.08 -0.4 0.28 
6.0 5.7 6.0 5.1 4.0 6.0 1.00 0.07 1.0 0.42 




2 5.7 5.3 5.0 3.1 3.3 3.0 0.23 0.09 0.42 -0.40 
2 5.6 6.0 5.0 2.9 3.3 3.0 0.30 0.16 0.28 -0.68 
2 5.1 5.3 4.0 4.3 4.7 3.0 0.66 0.06 -0.15 0.75 
2 5.0 4.3 4.0 4.7 4.0 4.0 0.48 0.10 -0.29 1.17 
2 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.1 4.0 2.0 0.53 0.09 -0.72 -0.40 
2 5.9 5.3 6.0 3.4 4.0 3.0 0.44 0.10 0.57 -0.11 
2 5.9 5.7 6.0 2.4 2.7 3.0 0.00 0.10 0.57 -1.11 
2 5.7 5.0 5.0 3.9 3.7 4.0 0.66 0.05 0.42 0.32 
2 5.0 4.7 5.0 3.3 4.0 4.0 0.48 0.15 -0.29 -0.25 




3 4.4 4.3 4.0 4.9 4.3 5.0 0.93 0.20 -0.6 0.0 
3 5.4 4.7 6.0 4.6 4.3 5.0 0.91 0.29 0.4 -0.3 
3 5.9 5.7 6.0 5.4 4.7 5.0 1.00 0.26 0.9 0.5 
3 5.0 4.7 5.0 5.6 4.7 5.0 0.61 0.20 0.0 0.7 
3 5.3 4.3 5.0 4.9 4.3 6.0 0.88 0.17 0.3 0.0 
3 5.1 3.7 5.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 0.99 0.25 0.1 -0.8 
3 4.6 4.7 6.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 0.83 0.27 -0.4 0.1 
3 4.3 5.0 4.0 4.3 4.7 4.0 0.61 0.31 -0.7 -0.6 
3 4.7 4.3 4.0 4.6 3.7 4.0 0.87 0.34 -0.3 -0.3 




4 4.3 5.0 5.0 3.1 2.3 3.0 0.42 0.32 -0.64 -0.24 
4 4.6 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 0.69 0.32 -0.36 0.62 
4 4.9 4.7 5.0 2.7 3.0 3.0 0.55 0.36 -0.07 -0.67 
4 4.1 4.3 4.0 2.9 3.3 4.0 0.54 0.33 -0.79 -0.52 
4 5.7 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.3 4.0 0.55 0.39 0.78 0.19 
4 5.4 6.0 6.0 3.9 3.7 3.0 0.68 0.32 0.50 0.48 
4 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.7 3.0 2.0 0.60 0.30 0.07 -0.67 
4 5.1 4.0 4.0 2.9 3.7 3.0 0.78 0.37 0.21 -0.52 
4 4.9 5.0 5.0 3.7 3.3 4.0 0.65 0.21 -0.07 0.33 
4 5.3 4.3 5.0 4.3 2.7 3.0 0.72 0.27 0.36 0.91 
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Appendix G: Participant Treatment-Group Assignment 









1 Non-IW Low 1 
2 Non-IW Low 2 
3 Non-IW Low 3 
4 Non-IW High 1 
5 Non-IW High 2 
6 Non-IW High 3 
7 IW Low 1 
8 IW Low 2 
9 IW Low 3 
10 IW High 1 
11 IW High 2 
12 IW High 3 
13 Non-IW Low 1 
14 Non-IW Low 2 
15 Non-IW Low 3 
16 Non-IW High 1 
17 Non-IW High 2 
18 Non-IW High 3 
19 IW Low 1 
20 IW Low 2 
21 IW Low 3 
22 IW High 1 
23 IW High 2 
24 IW High 3 
25 Non-IW Low 1 
26 Non-IW Low 2 
27 Non-IW Low 3 
28 Non-IW High 1 
29 Non-IW High 2 
30 Non-IW High 3 
31 IW Low 1 
32* IW Low 2 
33* IW Low 3 
34 IW High 1 
35* IW High 2 
36* IW High 3 
37* Non-IW Low 1 
38* Non-IW High 2 
39* IW Low 3 
40 IW High 1 
* Indicates ROTC Student 
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Appendix H: Training Presentation 
Why Are You Here 
To help in early field trials of emerging software 
technology that will aid Weapons Directors aboard 
E-3 AWACS Aircraft 
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Top Control Panel 
Activate 
Miss! eis Help Measures 
Inftrrnisatio'B Agent Selector 
t    /     / 
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Mayer        Agent 
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Mission     ',, Activate tie 
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Some System Functions 
• Logging In (All you need to enter is your participant ID) 




• Viewing Scores 8 
System Functions 
(Continued) 
•Automatic accepting of Recommendations 
• Manual accepting of Recommendations 
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Logging In (Result) 
10 
Viewing mission information 
Click Mission Information Button 
View Mission Information Window 
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Click Mission Information 
Button 
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Viewing Events 
• Make sure the Communication Panel is 
displayed. 
• View the Events 
14 
Display Communication Panel 
IlC^Bi^Bi^^BB^^BI PS^^JjfJ " Pp%r ^f                              ; 
^^^^^^^ 






A»   -„*! 





View the Events 
llU^^^B^^^p ... 
Jp^^^^^^^^Äi 
j I  w  i'-l|"ä   "  ! 
ff <^%     « it             ü 
!   1 J]" y '$*" ^Äi.iji.H. i 
'? ji   T' •'"■        I 




• Make sure the Navigation Panel is 
displayed 
• Select desired zoom ratio 
17 
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Display Navigation Panel 
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• Make sure the Navigation Panel is 
displayed 
• Press the map in the desired direction 
21 
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Display Navigation Panel 
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• View a Resource's Information 
• Manually accept a single 
r&u9mmeiMlatJioii (will cover this later) 
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To Issue Orders You: 
• Left click on the resource you wish to 
issue an order to. 
• Right click on desired target resources. 
• Right click on the map for GO orders. 




Left click on the resource you wish 
to issue an order to 
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Right click on desired tai 
resources 
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Right click on the map for GO 
orders 
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Left click on the map to process 
the orders 
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View a resource's information 
• Right click on the desired resource to 
display an information window 
• Click on the information window to close 
it 
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Right click on resource for 
information window 
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Left click on the information 
window to close it 
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Zoom Mode 
• Zoom In 
- Left click on the map 
• Zoom Out 







Left click on the map 
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Friendly / Not Paired 
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Resource Pairing Rules 
Pairing = engagements between hostile and 
friendly resources 
Paired are: 
- Friendly resources which have Target, Tank, or RTB 
order 
- Hostile resources which are being targeted 
- Any targeted city or base 
- Friendly resource with a tanking order 





Primary                                                 Secondary   i 
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Offers information in 
accordance with one's WD role 
Provides the user with primary 
and secondary missions 
Informs the user of scoring 
rules 
Provides a list of resources and 
scoring graph 
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On to First Practice Session 
97 
Intelligent Agent Tool 
Provides "best" targeting option based on current resources 
and threat threat level. 
• Allows for faster and more efficient resource allocation 
• Studies show, inexperienced WD score as well as 
experienced WD when using recommendations 
• Developed through Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
- AW ACS Weapons Directors helped design the Decision Support 
Algorithms 
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Activate the Agent (Pre set for you) 
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Manually accept a single 
recommendation 
• Make sure the agent is enabled 
• Receive recommendations 
• Click on a recommendation 
• Recommendation is accepted 
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Make sure the agent is enabled 
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Click on a recommendation 
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Recommendation is accepted 
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Manually accept 
all recommendations 
• Activate the Agent 
• Receive Recommendations 
Accept All Recommendations 
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Activate the Agent 
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Receive Recommendations 
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Accept all recommendations 
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